Currently the Antitrust Modernization Commission is considering numerous proposals for adjusting the relationship between federal antitrust authority and state regulation. This essay examines two areas that have produced a significant amount of state-federal conflict: state regulation of insurance and the "state action" immunity for general state regulation. It argues that no principle of efficiency, regulatory theory, or federalism justifies the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which creates an antitrust immunity for state regulation of insurance. What few benefits the Act confers could be fully realized by an appropriate interpretation of the state action doctrine. Second, the current formulation of the antitrust state action doctrine creates approximately the correct balance between state and federal authority where competition is concerned, although both its "clear articulation" and "active supervision" prongs need to be strengthened and refined. In addition, basing state action immunity on the degree to which a state imposes the burden of in-state monopoly on out-of-state interests very likely comes with greater costs than any benefit that is likely to result.
Court responded a year later with Parker v. Brown, 12 which created the antitrust state action doctrine, immunizing a state-sanctioned agreement that reduced the output of California raisins.
While the state action doctrine was entirely a creation of the Supreme Court, the views of Congress during this period were largely sympathetic. In South Eastern Underwriters, decided two years after Wickard and a year after Parker, the Supreme Court held that insurance transactions were within interstate commerce and thus within the reach of the Sherman Act.
13 Congress then responded in 1945 with the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which immunized the "business of insurance" from most federal legislation, including the antitrust laws.
14 McCarran-Ferguson is significant in part because in 1945, when that statute was passed, Congress clearly did have the power to reach intrastate transactions with interstate effects, thus overriding inconsistent state mandates. However, Congress largely chose not to do so with respect to insurance, preferring at that time to leave most of its regulation to the states.
Thus in the space of four years in the early 1940s the Supreme Court and Congress established what has become the modern framework for understanding the relationship between federal antitrust policy and regulation by the states. The question today is whether this framework still works, or whether it needs to be modernized or jettisoned completely. This essay offers a few basic considerations and some suggestions for reform. The considerations are these:
Changing Attitudes Toward Regulation and the Role of Antitrust
The relationship between federal antitrust policy and state economic regulation is driven in part by attitudes toward regulation. Although the point is easily overstated, today we are less optimistic about regulation than we were a half century ago. The state action exemption was formulated at a time when federal power was expanding rapidly and confidence in regulation was generally high.
15 By contrast, in the last quarter century we have become much less confident in regulation at every government level. The rise of public choice theory and the deregulation movement reflect different aspects of these changes. 16 Just as these changes have occasioned less deference to federal regulation, they can do the same thing for state or local government regulation.
One is tempted to say that during this same period we have acquired more confidence about the role of antitrust as an alternative to affirmative regulation in producing efficient economic outcomes. But that point is open to dispute, and some critics take just as dim a view of antitrust enforcement as they do of regulation. 17 To be sure, deregulation has increased the domain of antitrust by removing regulatory immunities that once existed. 18 As a result, antitrust is now applied in markets such as air passenger travel or telecommunications where there was once thought to be a substantial regulatory immunity. But to say that antitrust's domain has expanded is not necessarily to say that our confidence level in antitrust enforcement has increased as confidence in regulation has declined. One might as easily say that our confidence level in all types of government intervention in the market has declined, and that the decline cuts across both regulatory and antitrust policy.
Actually, the antitrust story is more nuanced than this. While we have become far more skeptical about our once aggressive policies against exclusionary practices, vertical restraints and mergers, antitrust policy is as fierce as ever about naked cartels. Problematically, however, the types of restraints for which state law regulatory immunity is sought run the full gamut. Some state regulation condones fairly blatant collusion. 19 However, antitrust challenges to state action are frequently brought under the weakest possible antitrust theories. 20 For example, it is hard to see any antitrust violation in a city's order to the dominant cable company to restrain its expansion for a time so that the city might assess whether entry by rivals is appropriate; 21 or a municipality's refusal to supply utilities to outlying areas that had not been annexed; 22 or its decision to create its own cable television system rather than purchasing CATV services from a private firm.
23 Many other state action cases involve challenges to such things as exclusive contracts, ordinarily treated as either exclusive dealing or tying. The great majority of such arrangements are lawful even when the firm imposing the arrangement is a monopolist, and in many of these cases the hospital or similar publicly operated institution claiming the exemption was only one of many competitors.
24 Still others are challenges to such practices as peer review which are rarely anticompetitive unless abused.
25 Others involve standard setting or rule making that cannot be an antitrust violation because no benefit accrues to the organization making the rules.
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Some see the rise of public choice theory as a compelling reason for either narrowing the reach of the state action immunity or for removing the immunity for proven instances of regulatory capture.
27 However, it is not clear to me that antitrust tribunals need to respond in any programmatic way to changes in regulatory attitude. Repairing imperfections in political processes is not antitrust's purpose. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has ever authorized the use of antitrust as a wide ranging mandate to fix imperfections in government process. Rather, the antitrust laws are explicitly designed to control private restraints. Further, most serious abuses of government process are better remedied by laws that are more directly tailored for that purpose, such as those condemning bribery, financial abuses or other forms of corruption. These laws do not carry antitrust's additional, significant proof requirements of market power and economic harm, and at least some of them are enforceable by criminal sanctions.
Public choice is relevant in another sense, however. Public choice theory serves as a warning that many so-called "public" restraints are really private restraints by another name. That message is two-fold: if a state or local government really authorizes and effectively supervises a private restraint, so be it. Federal antitrust cannot intervene simply because federal tribunals believe that the regulation in question is ill-advised, inefficient, or a manifestation of interest group capture. However, antitrust need not countenance restraints in which the effective decision makers are the market participants themselves.
28

Concerns for Federalism
Pulling in the opposite direction, the trimming of the federal regulatory agenda has been accompanied by a return to federalism --i.e, to take preemptive regulatory power away from the federal government and restore it to the states. This would seem to suggest more deference by federal antitrust tribunals to state regulation, and thus an expanded role for state action immunity.
Concerns for federalism were not particularly prominent in the Supreme Court's Parker decision. Rather, the Court seemed to regard the regulation in question as enacted in the public interest. 29 In sharp contrast, the first edition of the Areeda-Turner Antitrust Law treatise, published in 1978, seated the state action doctrine squarely within the authors' concerns for federalism. Areeda and Turner argued that the "proper" grounds for state action immunity were twofold. First, there should not be Parker immunity "without adequate public supervision" 31 The Supreme Court picked up these criteria almost verbatim in its Midcal Aluminum decision three years later, and since then "clear authorization" and "active supervision" have come to define the two elements for the state action doctrine, at least when the conduct in question is that of private parties.
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Thus it seems clear that, while the initial Parker v. Brown state action doctrine rested on ideas about regulatory supremacy rather than federalism, today that is no longer the case. Since Midcal neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts have indulged any presumption that state regulation is in the "public interest," or that it produces better outcomes than the antitrust laws would produce. Rather, the foundation of the doctrine lies in discernment of the state's own commitment to regulate. If that commitment is appropriately stated, then the federal tribunal should not intervene no matter what it may think of the merits of the regulation at issue.
Growth of Multistate Markets; Spillovers
The enlargement of markets and internationalization of the economy that provided the backdrop for the expansion of federal regulatory power in the 1930s ...a state may be free to determine for itself how much competition is desirable, provided that it substitutes adequate public control wherever it has substantially weakened competition.
... [T]he adequate supervision criterion ensures that state-federal conflict will be avoided in those area in which the state has demonstrated its commitment to a program through its exercise of regulatory oversight. At the same time, it guarantees that when the Sherman Act is set aside, private firms are not left to their own devices. Rather, immunity will be granted only when the state has substituted its own supervision for the economic constraints of the competitive market.
id. at 72-73 (footnotes omitted). (1980) . See 1 Antitrust Law &221f (3d). Under the post-Midcal case law the conduct of private parties must be both authorized and supervised. The conduct of the "state itself" is inherently authorized and need not be supervised. The conduct of officials representing state subdivisions, such as municipalities or most agencies, must be authorized but need not be supervised. For elaboration see 1 Antitrust Law &&221-227 (3d). and 1940s has not subsided. To the contrary, the rise of electronic markets has only served to accelerate the pace at which markets have become at least national and often international or even global. As a general proposition, regulation of large markets by small governments is inefficient because it results in excessive self dealing and protectionism. history of the Court that issue is squarely presented and must be decided.
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The South Eastern Underwriters case itself involved allegations of pricefixing among a half dozen insurers serving several states, as well as an agreement to boycott rivals and force purchasers to deal only with the defendants. The McCarran-Ferguson Act would have immunized the first of these claims, provided that insurance was adequately regulated, but its "boycott" exception would probably have denied immunity to the second.
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Notwithstanding its then recent decision in Parker the South Eastern Underwriters opinion took a much less accommodating attitude toward state regulation:
[I]t is argued at great length that virtually all the states regulate the insurance business on the theory that competition in the field of insurance is detrimental both to the insurers and the insured, and that if the Sherman Act be held applicable to insurance much of this state regulation will be destroyed. The first part of this argument is buttressed by opinions expressed by various persons that unrestricted competition in insurance results in financial chaos and public injury. Whether competition is a good thing for the insurance business is not for us to consider. Having power to enact the Sherman Act, Congress did so; if exceptions are to be written into the Act, they must come from the Congress, not this Court.
The argument that the Sherman Act necessarily invalidates many state laws regulating insurance we regard as exaggerated. Few states go so far as to permit private insurance companies, without state supervision, to agree upon and fix uniform insurance rates. No states authorize combinations of insurance companies to coerce, intimidate, and boycott competitors and consumers in the manner here alleged, and it cannot be that any companies have acquired a vested right to engage in such.... industry from federal laws of general application, and included an antitrust exemption that applied if the insurance business was regulated by state law.
39
In 1945, when the McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed, Congress apparently did not foresee subsequent developments in the antitrust state action doctrine that would have served to immunize many insurance restraints, provided that they were adequately regulated. Indeed, the state action doctrine would have provided a much more balanced approach to the problem of ineffectual state insurance regulation.
One of the ironies of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is that it tends to immunize practices that pose a significant threat to competition, such as competitor agreements fixing rates or reducing policy coverage, 40 but not various vertical practices that are almost certainly not antitrust violations at all. By its terms the statute applies only to the "business of insurance," which involves such things as the making of rates or the determination of policy coverage. On the other hand, purely vertical arrangements under which insurers provide prescription drugs or other non-insurance services or engage in peer review of providers are frequently held to fall outside the "business of insurance," and thus are non-immune. The same thing is true of insurer efforts at cost control via limitations of such things as auto repair prices. 41 In sum, the statute tends to immunize serious horizontal restraints while finding no immunity for vertical restraints that are far less likely to be anticompetitive. While the statute seems to allow for broader application of the antitrust laws to insurance than other federal provisions, 42 the courts have not read it that way. Further, the phrase "regulated by state law" in the McCarran-Ferguson Act has come to mean something quite different than the "authorization" and "active supervision" required by the state action doctrine. To illustrate, suppose that the state has insurance regulation in place, but the general thrust of this regulation is to oppose horizontal agreements fixing insurance premiums. In such a case one might say that a Sherman Act complaint alleging unlawful price fixing would be in furtherance of rather than inconsistent with the state's regulatory policy. Nevertheless, the courts generally agree that the Sherman Act complaint is preempted. The mere presence of state regulation is sufficient to oust the federal antitrust claim.
In addition, the courts have generally been satisfied with virtually any degree of regulation, and even the most superficial indicators of supervision.
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They have suggested that the mere existence of an agency or official with insurance oversight is adequate regulation.
44 The Ninth Circuit believes that the mere fact that the state has appointed an insurance commissioner and required him to approve all policies is sufficient. regulation from the fact that a state statute banned unfair or deceptive practices in the health insurance industry. 46 The courts have not required authorization of the specific conduct that is the subject of the antitrust challenge. 47 The Eighth Circuit has held that a statute giving the state power to "investigate" rates and methods of competition was sufficient regulation to support the immunity, even if there was no evidence that actual investigating was occurring.
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In sum, the McCarran-Ferguson immunity requires no "active supervision" of private conduct at all, and only the most general statement of authorization, certainly nothing like the authorization requirement in the state action doctrine. This business is not separated into 48 distinct territorial compartments which function in isolation from each other. Interrelationship, interdependence, and integration of activities in all the states in which they operate are practical aspects of the insurance companies' methods of doing business. A large share of the insurance business is concentrated in a comparatively few companies located, for the most part, in the financial centers of the East. Premiums collected from policyholders in national markets. While this fact may not make state regulation unimportant, it exacerbates the possibility of socially harmful spillovers.
In sum, repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act need not have any harmful consequences for federalism or the competitive health of the insurance industry. Bona fide regulatory oversight will continue to qualify the industry for the state action exemption, provided that the authorization and supervision requirements are met.
Reform of the Antitrust "State Action" Doctrine
The current Parker state action immunity doctrine could be improved in several ways. First, too many courts interpret the authorization requirement far too broadly. In Midcal the Supreme Court required "clear articulation" and "affirmative expression" of a state intent to authorize the "challenged restraint."
51
Writing a few years prior to Midcal, Areeda and Turner expressed this requirement as a "clear statement" rule that presumed lack of immunity unless the relevant statute stated its intent clearly.
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every part of the United States flow into these companies for investment. As policies become payable, checks and drafts flow back to the many states where the policyholders reside. The result is a continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among the states composed of collections of premiums, payments of policy obligations, and the countless documents and communications which are essential to the negotiation and execution of policy contracts. Individual policyholders living in many different states who own policies in a single company have their separate interests blended in one assembled fund of assets upon which all are equally dependent for payment of their policies. The decisions which that company makes at its home office--the risks it insures, the premiums it charges, the investments it makes, the losses it pays--concern not just the people of the state where the home office happens to be located. They concern people living far beyond the boundaries of that state. the determination of both the meaning of state approval and the extent of state authorization must be subject to a clear statement requirement. Adoption of a policy requiring a state to make a clear statement of it intention to supplant competition reconciles the interests of the states in adopting non-competitive policies with the strong national policy favoring competition, and is consistent with the canon of federal statutory construction that exemptions to the antitrust laws are not to be lightly inferred. Where there is no other indication of the proper scope of an officer's authority or of the meaning of state approval, a clear statement requirement is the best approach, because it ensures that the strong federal policy embodied in the antitrust laws will not be set aside where not intended by the state, and yet also guarantees that the state will not be prevented by the antitrust laws alone from supplanting those laws as long as it makes its purpose clear....
After a few years of restrictive interpretations of this requirement the Supreme Court loosened it up, finding in Hallie that it was sufficient if the restraint was a "foreseeable result" of the regulatory authorization.
53 Since Hallie the trend in the lower courts has been to interpret state statutes generously so as to find authorization. Indeed, the courts have gone so far as to infer clear articulation from such things as the granting of ordinary corporate powers --inferring, for example, that a general grant of the corporate power to make contracts authorized a public hospital's anticompetitive exclusionary contracts.
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Other decisions have properly been much more restrictive. One court very wisely rejected the argument that courts should infer: a policy to displace competition from naked grants of authority. These are the enabling statutes by which myriad instruments of local government across the country gain basic corporate powers. To infer a policy to displace competition from, for example, authority to enter into joint ventures or other business forms would stand federalism on its head. A state would henceforth be required to disclaim affirmatively antitrust immunity, at the peril of creating an instrument of local government with power the state did
The clear statement requirement does not prevent the state from indicating its interest, as it can always make its intent clear. It merely ensures that the inertia in the system is used in the service of the federal interest in free competition.
Id. at 91-92 (footnotes omitted). . 1994 ), holding that a statute authorizing a university to "acquire by grant, purchase, gift, devise, lease, or by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and ... hold use, sell, lease, or dispose of any real or personal property necessary for the full exercise or convenient or useful for the carrying on of any of its powers. . . ." authorized it to agree with a private firm to obtain an exclusive patent license by fraud. No doubt the court was impelled by serious doubts of any antitrust violation; but if there were one, a statute giving a university a general power to acquire, manage and dispose of property hardly includes anticompetitive agreements in violation of federal antitrust law as a foreseeable consequence. not intend to grant. The immediate practical effect would be the extension of the Parker principle downward, contrary to the teaching that local instruments of government are subject to the Sherman Act.
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
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Although Hallie permitted an inference of authorization to be drawn from foreseeability, the inference that the Supreme Court drew in that case was not a particularly long stretch. The City of Eau Claire was accused of refusing to provide sewage treatment services to unincorporated areas around it unless these areas first agreed to be incorporated. The authorizing provision that the City relied on expressly permitted the City to refuse to provide services to unincorporated areas, 56 but it did not expressly authorize anticompetitive actions or antitrust violations. Likewise, in Columbia the Supreme Court found it sufficiently foreseeable that a grant of power to regulate the land use process contemplated the power to control the type and placement of advertising billboards. 57 In sharp contrast, all corporations are granted the power to enter into contracts, but this hardly expresses a "clear articulation" of the state's desire that they be permitted to enter into anticompetitive agreements.
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As a general rule ambiguities in state authorizing provisions should be construed against authorization. This conclusion flows from the fact that the antitrust laws declare a clear national policy of preventing anticompetitive may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the area within which service will be provided and the municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond the area so delineated.
Further, Wis.Stat. '144.07(1) (1981) (1982) provided that the state's Department of Natural Resources may require a city to interconnect with surrounding areas; however, it also provided that such an order would be void if the outlying territory refused to become annexed to the city. See Hallie, 471 U.S. at 41. restraints, and that most states declare a similar policy via their own antitrust laws or regulatory provisions. As a result state and local government regulatory policy is painted on a canvas in which federal and state policies favoring competition form a clear background. While the Parker doctrine rests on the premise that a state is free to deviate from this policy in specific situations if it chooses, such deviations should not be found absent a clear expression by the state that it desires to do so.
59 When a state grants power to an inferior entity it presumably grants the power to do the thing contemplated, but not to do so anticompetitively. For example, an authorization to a corporation to enter into contracts is not to be construed as an authorization to enter into price-fixing or other anticompetitive agreements unless the authorizing provision states so clearly.
The problem with the "active supervision" requirement has not been quite as severe since the Supreme Court's decision in Ticor Title 60 establishing that active supervision requires actual government review of private conduct.
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Nevertheless, there are still problem areas. For example, there is much to be said for the FTC's suggestion that if a state regulatory agency is going to approve a particular instance of rate bureaus or other forms of regulatory price fixing it should issue a written opinion on the merits, supported by a set of fact findings that explain its decision. subject to a challenged restraint. Or the resale price maintenance scheme at issue in Midcal almost certainly affected out-of-state wine purchasers. 74 But unless we want to jettison the state action exemption altogether, these spillovers are going to have to be regarded as de minimis, or as not sufficiently substantial to invoke any exception to the immunity.
Beyond that, we certainly cannot expect litigants to conduct a cost-benefit analysis tailored after the Kaldor-Hicks model of economic efficiency, asking whether the harmful impact on out-of-state interests was larger than the benefits conferred on in-state residents. Doing so would move the state action immunity from one of relatively simple disposition on motions to dismiss or early summary judgment into a litigation nightmare involving multiple experts and costly empirical studies. It must be borne in mind that often these disputes are relatively small in the world of antitrust cases, involving such things as a single physician's challenge to the policies of a public hospital, or a small trash removal firm's or taxicab operator's challenge to an exclusive franchise. Further, public defendants such as municipalities lack the resources for costly litigation.
To be sure, one can imagine egregious situations in which the impact of state regulation falls almost entirely on out-of-state interests, but then it seems the dormant Commerce Clause would be sufficient to handle the problem.
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It is largely for this reason that the Antitrust Law treatise has played down the spillover problem, even though I was one of the authors cited in the FTC's Report as stating the spillover concern.
76 Yes, it is a concern, but the most fundamental piece of cost-benefit analysis of all is an assessment whether the benefits of taking extraterritorial spillovers into account will be justified by the very considerable increase in costs likely to affect most state action cases. state spillovers be taken into account in deciding the immunity question.
77 The limitation to "overwhelming" is undoubtedly intended to address the fact finding problem, but even so, a broad factual inquiry will be required. The authors then add in a footnote:
When the degree of spillover is more marginal, and difficult to measure, prudence and a desire for legal rules with ex ante predictability counsel against giving significant weight to interstate spillovers. But where the benefits of a given anticompetitive restriction accrue overwhelmingly to residents of the state implementing the restriction, and the harms fall overwhelmingly on residents of other states, then the considerations behind both the Interstate Commerce Clause and the federal antitrust laws are at their height, and the case for judicial recognition of those spillovers is at its strongest.
78
Still, one wonders whether there will be restraints that meet this test for antitrust purposes, but would not be excluded in any event by the dormant commerce clause.
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Finally, antitrust tribunals need to be somewhat more sensitive to substantive issues of antitrust policy in deciding questions that implicate the state action immunity. Too many cases have required lengthy appellate litigation, sometimes even to the Supreme Court, when the case could have been disposed of far more readily on antitrust grounds. The FTC has somewhat ambiguously suggested a "tiered" approach to the state action immunity, with a clearer state articulation of purpose to displace the antitrust laws required as the restraint becomes more anticompetitive.
80 While one can appreciate the 77. Report, note 58 at 56.
78.
Id. at 57 n. 242.
79.
One possibility is municipal restraints where the impact of the restraint falls outside of the municipality but within the state. In that case, however, the issue is probably best left to state law. Pursuant to such a tiered approach, the level of clear articulation required would increase or decrease, depending on the nature of the anticompetitive conduct at issue. This approach reflects that fact that, the more serious the nature of the anticompetitive conduct, the more likely it is to restrain trade. Thus, it is logical to assume that the alleged beneficiary of a restraint will be more likely to engage in more serious anticompetitive conduct as such conduct is also more likely to be successful. Increasing the level of clear articulation required to match the seriousness of the alleged anticompetitive conduct should therefore create at least a rough link between the defendant's incentives and a grant of state action protection, with the underlying concern, this approach overly complicates an already complex doctrine. It would be far better to require that articulation be clear in all cases, under a plain statement rule. When concerns for competition seem relatively modest, rather than watering down the articulation requirement litigants and courts would do better to go straight to the merits. The previously mentioned Boulder decision, which was litigated all the way to the Supreme Court, provides a good example. Uncertain about the best course for future development of its cable television system the City of Boulder enacted a moratorium on further expansion of its incumbent cable television provider while it considered whether such expansion was preferable to new entry by other providers. The complaint should have been dismissed on the pleadings. First, the City of Boulder was not a participant in the cable television market at all. Second, the plaintiff was claiming an antitrust right to expand its monopoly franchise rather than permitting the city to inaugurate competition.
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The state action immunity is essential in situations where state regulation endorses collusion or similar practices that are almost certainly antitrust violations when committed in the private sector. It is completely unnecessary when a state or local government regulates in a way that never gives rise to an antitrust cause of action to begin with. The tougher cases are a relatively small number in the middle --arguable rule of reason violations but a colorable case for state authorization and active supervision. With respect to these I do not believe that a more lenient test for immunity is the right approach; the state either declares an intention to displace the antitrust laws or it doesn't. In most such cases an examination of the antitrust merits would be a much quicker road to resolution.
Conclusion
Federal antitrust policy has always been delimited by concerns for federalism. While the role of the states in regulating their own economies is not as significant today as it was when the Sherman Act was passed, that is no reason for jettisoning our concerns to preserve a federal system of economic regulation, provided that doing so is defensible on policy grounds and not too costly. When a state regulates well, appropriately limiting the range of private entrepreneurial discretion, then federal antitrust must ordinarily stand aside, even though the federal decision maker thinks that the state regulatory regime in question is poorly designed or inefficient. However, concerns for federalism do result that the "clear articulation" requirement will be most rigorous where the defendant is most likely to engage in anticompetitive conduct.
